



EMBRACE

Policy Brief 03

Nurturing Democracy in Exile: How Belarusian Pro-Democracy Forces are Defying Authoritarianism

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Executive Summary

This policy brief examines the resilience of Belarusian pro-democracy forces since the 2020 protests, focusing on their adaptation under intense repression. It explores how democracy activists have reorganised in exile, using digital technologies and social media to maintain connections with audiences in Belarus. Drawing on interviews with Belarusian activists and experts, the policy brief emphasises the need for more effective, sustainable financial support for democratic forces, particularly from the European Union (EU). It also calls for the EU to develop a clear strategy on Belarus. Such strategies are essential for supporting Belarusian aspirations for democracy.

1 Introduction to the EMBRACE project

The EMBRACE research project (2022-2025) collects evidence-based knowledge on the obstacles to democratisation and ways to overcome them in five regions of the European neighbourhood: Southern Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Western Balkans, Middle East and North Africa. Its aim is to strengthen the capacity of policymakers and pro-democracy forces to develop effective strategies to promote democratic progress in the European neighbourhood. In addition to research reports and policy briefs, new policy tools for EUDP practitioners and pro-democracy activists are developed based on the project's findings.

The EMBRACE consortium consists of 14 partner organisations based in 13 countries, and places particular emphasis on locally led research with deep contextual familiarity and stakeholder access within the regions under study. It brings together partners with unique and complementary strengths as well as shared areas of interest, in order to foster joint learning and development.

Empirical data was gathered in twelve case study countries through a variety of research approaches, investigating episodes of political closure and opening to identify, analyse and explain behavioural, institutional and structural blockages, and the conditions under which they can be overcome. A new quantitative dataset was generated on the larger trends of EU Democracy Promotion and its effects on democratisation over the last two decades in all 23 neighbours.

The research is structured around four thematic clusters: the re-configurations for democratic policy shifts after popular uprisings; democratisation and economic modernisation in authoritarian and hybrid regimes; the nexus between democratisation and peace; and the geopolitics of EUDP and the competition that the EU encounters in its democracy promotion efforts.



2 Introduction to this Policy Brief

For three decades Belarus has been under the authoritarian rule of Alexander Lukashenka, who has systematically dismantled democratic institutions, suppressed civil society, and maintained power through rigged elections and brutal repression. The events of 2020 marked a turning point in Belarus's political landscape, igniting a nationwide pro-democracy movement that continues to challenge the regime's grip on power. However, the aftermath has seen an unprecedented level of repression, with around 1200 political prisoners, widespread arrests, and the systematic dismantling of opposition structures (Human Rights Center Viasna 2024). With Lukashenka maintaining his hold over the country following the last falsified elections in January 2025, the first since the 2020 upheaval, the stakes for democratic forces are particularly high as they face the challenge of maintaining momentum and relevance in the face of intensified repression and the risk of international attention waning.

This policy brief examines the resilience and adaptation of Belarusian democratic forces¹ since the 2020 protests, focusing on their efforts to maintain democratic aspirations under severe repression. It analyses how the democratic forces have reorganised in exile, establishing proto-democratic structures and developing strategies for future transition. Drawing on twenty semi-structured interviews with Belarusian activists and experts, the policy brief highlights innovative approaches to maintaining connections with audiences inside Belarus, including the use of digital technologies and social media. It also explores the challenges of operating in exile and efforts to foster democratic culture and presents recommendations for enhancing international democracy support.

3 The Emergence of Democratic Aspirations

The emergence of democratic aspirations in Belarus can be traced to the country's brief period of independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the formation of civil society organisations and nascent democratic institutions (Marples 2020; Wilson 2021). However, Lukashenka's rise to power in 1994 and subsequent consolidation of authoritarian rule significantly hindered the development of these democratic structures (Silitski and Zaprudnik 2022). Despite the repressive environment, democratic aspirations persisted, manifesting in various forms of civic engagement and occasional public protests (Bedford 2017; Bosse 2012). The 2006 "Jeans Revolution" and the 2010 post-election demonstrations, although ultimately suppressed, demonstrated the enduring desire for democratic change among segments of the Belarusian population (Ash 2014).

¹ The Belarusian democratic forces refer to a coalition of political groups, opposition leaders, civil society organisations, and grassroots movements advocating for democratic change in Belarus.

4 The 2020 Turning Point and Repressions

The year 2020 was a turning point for Belarus's democratic movement. The regime's dismissive response to COVID-19 eroded public trust and exposed the regime's inability to manage the crisis (Shraibman 2020), allowing civil society to self-organise and mobilise against the falsified election results (Astapova et al. 2022). Years of economic decline, worsened by the pandemic, further fuelled public discontent and weakened the 'social contract' between Lukashenka and Belarusian society (Dobrinsky 2020).

The 2020 presidential campaign introduced new opposition figures, most notably Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who, along with Maria Kalesnikava and Veronika Tsepkala, rallied public support and posed a credible challenge to Lukashenka (Crabtree, Jenne and Palik 2021). After the clearly falsified election results on 9 August (Rudnik 2020), social media, particularly Telegram, enabled rapid information sharing and coordination among protesters (Gaufman and Kalinina 2022). Both the campaign and protests saw unprecedented female leadership, and violent crackdowns sparked outrage, further mobilising citizens (Human Rights Watch 2021). Protests drew hundreds of thousands from a broad social spectrum, including IT workers, pensioners, students, and state-factory workers (Mateo 2022; Onuch, Shlyk and Voy-Gillis 2021), underscoring the movement's strength and resilience.

The regime's response to the 2020 protests was swift and brutal, unleashing unprecedented repression across Belarus. Authorities targeted opposition leaders, activists, journalists, lawyers, and ordinary citizens, leading to the dismantling of most independent CSOs by mid-2021. Over 1,000 CSOs, including prominent human rights groups like Viasna, were forcibly closed (Amnesty International 2021). Legal changes criminalised public dissent, with fines increased tenfold and nearly all public activities labelled as "extremist" (International Federation for Human Rights 2022). This forced many civil society actors into exile or underground, where many continue to operate at great personal risk, though in reduced numbers.²

Since 2023, the regime has further tightened its control by distinguishing between 'loyal' and 'disloyal' citizens, using propaganda to label Belarusians in exile as traitors. Cross-border repression tactics now target the families and friends of exiles, restrict consular services, auction property, and prosecute dissidents in absentia (Korshunau 2024). In response to this repressive climate, civil society activities have become more local and discreet, with some groups shifting focus to non-political, community-building events to maintain social connections and civic engagement under the radar. As one interviewee noted, these might include activities like watching films, exercising, or hiking together.³ While even these activities are increasingly monitored by the secret services, they help preserve civic spaces, offering potential for future mobilisation despite the regime's attempts to divide and control society.

² Interview, 11 March 2024.

³ Ibid.

5 Challenges in Exile

Operating in exile presents significant challenges for Belarusian pro-democracy activists and CSOs. A major issue is communication, particularly with those still in Belarus, as travel to the country and hosting in-person events carries major risks. Online activities are possible, but people in Belarus either need to be verified by the organisers to join in meetings, use a VPN, or carry the risk of being tracked by the security services while attending ‘extremist meetings’.⁴ This creates a two-way barrier: it is difficult for diaspora organisations to reach those inside Belarus or obtain information from the country, and increasingly hard for people in Belarus to stay in touch with contacts abroad, undermining the effectiveness of exiled organisations.

Belarusians in exile also face legal and bureaucratic challenges, such as problems with document recognition in host countries,⁵ further complicated by the suspension of consular services since September 2023 (Korshunau 2024). These hurdles hinder integration and activism. Additionally, securing stable funding for exile-based organisations is difficult, especially as Belarusian issues fade from international media attention.⁶

Lastly, the stress of displacement, combined with concerns for those left behind, can have long-lasting effects on mental health and well-being (Kazakou and Thomas 2025). Despite these challenges, exiled Belarusian civil society organisations have managed to maintain a degree of effectiveness and continue their work towards democratic change in Belarus (Bedford 2021). Their resilience and adaptability in the face of these obstacles demonstrate the ongoing commitment to the cause of democracy in Belarus.

While the immediate goal of establishing democracy in Belarus remains elusive, the pro-democracy movement has made significant strides in deepening democratic norms and developing proto-democratic institutions in exile. It has established several structures aimed at representing a democratic Belarus and preparing for eventual transition. Political scientist Andrei Kazakevich describes the state of the Belarusian democratic forces as follows: “Although it is usually said that Belarusians are divided, in many other nations in a similar situation there was more fragmentation and splits. In the Belarusian democratic movement, the main trend since 2020 has been not fragmentation, but institutional consolidation, even if political differences persist” (Belsat 2024).

The first of these key bodies is the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, based in Vilnius, which serves as the primary representative entity for the democratic forces. The second is the United Transitional Cabinet, located in Warsaw, which functions as a government-in-exile, with representatives addressing a wide array of issues, from the economy and foreign affairs to education and social policy. The third body is the Coordination Council, initially established in Belarus to facilitate a peaceful transition of power but later evolving into a forum for

⁴ Interview, 16 January 2024.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Interviews, January and May 2024.

Belarusian civil society in exile. The Council held online elections in May 2024 and is sometimes referred to as a “proto-parliament,” serving as a platform for communication and the coordination of practical activities across a broad spectrum of political and social forces, with its composition determined through democratic processes⁷.

These structures have successfully secured a certain level of international recognition and support. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, for example, gained access to platforms previously unavailable to Belarus, including participation in events like the G7 and the European Political Community. By formalising cooperation with the West, the Belarusian opposition in exile has strengthened its legitimacy and effectiveness through the establishment of government-like bodies that formulate policies, adopt strategic documents, and operate according to democratic principles.

A major challenge for the exiled opposition is maintaining legitimacy and relevance among Belarusians both inside and outside the country. Participation and recognition of opposition structures have been hindered by the difficulties of organising from abroad, fears of repression, and disillusionment with the outcomes of the 2020 uprising. Additionally, the legitimacy of the United Transitional Cabinet and Coordination Council remains contested within the Belarusian community, as their mandates are not derived from nation-wide democratic elections.⁸

Despite these constraints, these institutions reflect several key aspects of democratic governance. They represent a broad spectrum of political and social forces, promoting pluralism and ensuring diverse views are considered, a crucial element of democracy. They also serve as platforms for open political debate and deliberation representing diverse views and needs of Belarusians both inside and outside the country. While operating outside of Belarus, these institutions adhere to democratic procedures, signalling an effort to establish the rule of law. Additionally, the division of powers within these bodies, even in its early stages, reflects an understanding of the democratic principle of checks and balances. Their engagement with international actors further strengthens their legitimacy. Overall, while these institutions face challenges, they are striving to embody fundamental democratic values such as pluralism, debate, accountability, and the rule of law, and thereby provide a democratic infrastructure for Belarusians in exile to interact and deliberate among each other, and sustain vital support for Belarusians in Belarus.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Interviews, 16 January, 3 April and 13 May 2024.

6 Adaptation and Resilience

Despite facing severe repression, legal, and financial challenges, Belarusian civil society has shown extraordinary resilience and adaptability. Many activists and organisations have been forced into exile, primarily in neighbouring countries like Poland, Lithuania, and Georgia (Chulitskaya 2024). These groups have had to adjust their priorities to continue their work under increasingly difficult circumstances. Since 2020, three key areas have emerged as focal points for exiled civil society organisations:

Support for Political Prisoners and Their Families

One of the primary focuses of exiled Belarusian civil society has been to support those imprisoned for their political beliefs, and their families. This includes providing legal aid to prisoners, offering financial assistance to their families, and raising international awareness about their plight (Human Rights Watch 2021). Given that supporting political prisoners is considered a criminal act by the regime, this work is incredibly risky for both those within Belarus and those in exile. The continued effort to offer this support is crucial to maintaining pressure on the regime and offering hope to those detained.

Preservation of Belarusian Culture and Language

In the face of severe repression of national identity within Belarus, exiled organisations have made concerted efforts to preserve Belarusian culture and language. This includes the organisation of cultural events, the promotion of Belarusian language education, and the preservation of historical and cultural artefacts that are at risk of being lost. By fostering a sense of national identity abroad, the diaspora serves as a vital link to Belarusian culture and history, ensuring its continuity even as these aspects are under threat within the country (Bekus 2022). Cultural preservation is seen not only as a form of resistance but as a means to maintain the distinctiveness of Belarusian identity for future generations.

Independent media outlets operating in exile have also become a key priority for Belarusian civil society, as they play a vital role in providing alternative sources of information to counter state propaganda (Latushko 2021). These outlets strive to keep Belarusians informed about developments both inside and outside the country, utilising various digital platforms to circumvent government censorship. However, the use of digital technologies also presents challenges. The Belarusian government has implemented sophisticated digital repression techniques, including internet shutdowns, content blocking, facial recognition and surveillance (United States Embassy in Belarus 2022). This ongoing "cat-and-mouse" struggle between the regime and civil society underscores the importance of continued innovation and adaptation in the use of digital technologies for democratic activism.

Support for the Belarusian Diaspora

With an increasing number of Belarusians seeking refuge abroad, exiled organisations have also taken on the role of assisting the growing diaspora. This includes providing practical support for newly arrived exiles, such as helping with housing, healthcare, and legal matters.

Many diaspora organisations also facilitate community-building through social events, such as gatherings, protests, and informational sessions, which help maintain ties among exiled Belarusians. Prominent examples include the Belarusian Solidarity Center in Warsaw and RAZAM in Germany, both of which provide not only social and legal support but also act as hubs for advocacy efforts. Through ‘people’s embassies’ in various host countries, these organisations work to ensure that the needs of the diaspora are met and that they remain connected to the struggle for a democratic Belarus.

Organisations in exile are providing online courses and workshops on democracy, human rights, and civic engagement. One interviewee emphasised the importance of preparing the diaspora for eventual return and rebuilding, and to be the force of change for the country⁹. Examples are the well-established European Humanities University in Vilnius¹⁰, and the training of a future cadre of officials for a democratic Belarus at Warsaw University¹¹. This underscores the focus on maintaining skills and readiness within the exiled community. There is a particular focus on engaging young Belarusians in democratic initiatives, recognising their potential as future leaders (Nikolayenko 2015). Youth engagement is crucial for the long-term sustainability of the democratic movement. As one activist pointed out, it is important for the EU to support youth and youth organisations since these people will be the future politicians and leaders of new, democratic, systems.¹²

These three areas – support for political prisoners, cultural preservation, and diaspora assistance – have enabled Belarusian civil society to stay active despite significant obstacles, maintaining momentum for future mobilisation and offering vital support to democratic forces inside Belarus.

7 The Role of International Support

International support for democracy and democratisation has been essential for the Belarusian democratic forces, especially given the challenges posed by both domestic and cross-border repression, limited movement due to Belarusian citizens' non-EU status, and the regime's complicity in Russia's war against Ukraine. It is crucial for international actors to differentiate between the Belarusian government and its people, offering support to those striving for democratic change, while also prioritising attention to human rights violations.

The EU is a key democracy promoter for Belarus. The EU traditionally focuses on structural support, such as cultural, economic, and educational initiatives, while collaborating with authorities to improve rule of law and democratic standards, with long-term, project-based support. However, since 2020, the EU’s approach has shifted, increasingly resembling that of

⁹ Interview, April 25, 2024.

¹⁰ European Humanities University: <https://en.ehu.lt/>.

¹¹ University of Warsaw: <https://studium.uw.edu.pl/oglaszamy-nabor-do-specjalistycznego-programu-ksztalcenia-studium-dyplomacyjne/>

¹² Interview, April 19, 2024.

the US before the suspension of support from USAID, with greater emphasis on direct engagement with political movements and civil society.

Support from the EU and its member states has played a crucial role in sustaining Belarusian democratic forces, particularly since 2020. In response to the ongoing repression, the EU has significantly adjusted its approach to Belarus (EU Council 2024), implementing various measures aimed at strengthening civil society and pressuring the regime. This shift is evident in the EU's increasing focus on supporting non-state actors, such as civil society organisations and independent media, rather than providing assistance to state authorities. Diplomatic engagement has also evolved, with the EU reducing contact with the Belarusian regime while prioritising high-level communication with Belarusian democratic forces and civil society, notably through the EU-Belarus Consultative Group¹³ established in 2023. This shift in strategy has provided legitimacy and vital support to the Belarusian opposition in exile, helping to sustain its efforts for democratic change.

In addition to diplomatic and financial support, the EU has played a key role in facilitating the relocation and re-establishment of Belarusian CSOs in exile, enabling civil society groups to continue their work from neighbouring countries. The EU has also committed to a €3 billion comprehensive plan for Belarus, which outlines a framework for the country's future democratic transition. To further support the Belarusian opposition, the EU has ensured flexibility in its reporting and implementation requirements, adapting to the challenging security conditions faced by activists. The EU's efforts also extend to academic support through the EU4Belarus initiative, which aids Belarusian students and researchers within the EU. Furthermore, the European Parliament has adopted a non-recognition policy regarding Lukashenka's presidency and has backed the "WeStandBYyou" initiative, through which individual MEPs have taken a stand in solidarity with political prisoners in Belarus.

8 Limitations of Democracy Support and Recommendations

The EU's approach to supporting Belarusian democratic forces has faced significant challenges and limitations. However, the research also identified ways to counter these limitations.

Enhancing responses

A first limitation has been the EU's slow response to developments in Belarus. As one interviewee noted, the words of EU Foreign Affairs Chief Josep Borrell—"too little, too slow"—capture the frustration many feel regarding the EU's delayed actions in addressing the situation in Belarus.¹⁴ This sentiment reflects broader dissatisfaction with the pace of EU engagement, particularly when compared to the urgency of the crisis (Bosse 2021; Yahorau 2024). Several interviewees also emphasised that, given the high stakes for lives and livelihoods, the EU could have done more to act in line with its stated values and

¹³ <https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/latest-news/belarus-eu-launches-new-consultative-group-with-democratic-forces-and-civil-society/>

¹⁴ Interview, April 25, 2024.

commitments, rather than just speaking about them.¹⁵ The perceived slow pace of action is especially evident in the application of EU sanctions, where many argue that they could and should be implemented more swiftly in response to ongoing human rights violations.¹⁶

Increasing flexibility

Second, the bureaucratic nature of EU funding mechanisms has impeded the EU's ability to respond flexibly and quickly to the rapidly changing political situation in Belarus.¹⁷ This structural inflexibility has often hindered the EU's capacity to provide timely and effective support to Belarusian CSOs. To address the bureaucratic nature of EU funding mechanisms, one key suggestion is the creation of a dedicated Belarus Democracy Support Fund, designed with simplified application and disbursement procedures. This fund would reduce bureaucratic delays and allow for more efficient and targeted support of democratic initiatives in Belarus. Additionally, implementing a two-tier funding system—combining rapid response grants for immediate needs and long-term strategic funding for sustained support—would enable the EU to address both urgent and ongoing democratic efforts more effectively. Furthermore, delegating more decision-making authority to EU delegations and local partners would allow for faster reactions to emerging situations on the ground, ensuring timely support when it is most critical.

To enhance flexibility, it is recommended that the EU adopt measures like allowing flexible budget reallocation within approved projects. This would enable grantees to adjust funds in response to evolving needs, ensuring that financial support remains impactful in changing circumstances. Another suggestion is to introduce rolling application deadlines for certain funding streams, allowing organisations to apply for funding as needs arise, rather than being constrained by rigid deadlines. Finally, forming partnerships with intermediary organisations that can efficiently distribute EU funds to grassroots initiatives would provide a more agile mechanism for supporting local efforts. These organisations, with their knowledge of local contexts, can ensure that funds are allocated in the most effective manner to meet urgent and targeted needs on the ground.

Formulating a long-term strategy

Third, the lack of a clear, long-term strategy for Belarus has further complicated EU action. Despite nearly five years since the 2020 protests, the absence of a comprehensive and coordinated EU strategy has already led to inconsistent actions and overlapping initiatives that have, at times, diluted the impact of EU support for Belarusian democratic forces (Clingendael Spectator 2023). To address the lack of a long-term strategy for Belarus, the EU should take steps to create a clear, coordinated approach, for example by establishing a high-level EU-Belarus Strategy Working Group, which builds further on the achievements and formats of the EU Consultative Group with the Belarusian democratic forces and civil society and the Senior Officials' Meetings (SOM). This working group can draft a 5-10 year strategic plan,

¹⁵ Interview, May 16, 2024.

¹⁶ Interviews, February 26, 2024; March 11, 2024; April 3, 2024; May 24, 2024; June 14, 2024.

¹⁷ Interview, April 20, 2024.

incorporating input from Belarusian democratic forces and CSOs, and EU member states. This group would define clear strategic objectives, milestones, and success indicators for EU engagement with Belarus. Additionally, the EU should appoint a Special Representative for Belarus to oversee strategy implementation and ensure coordination across EU institutions. Regular meetings among EU bodies, member states, and key partners would facilitate information sharing and align efforts. Creating a shared database of EU-funded grants would also help CSOs and other actors to find and access the grant opportunities.

Countering Russian influence in Belarus

Fourth, the EU has struggled to counter Russia's influence in Belarus, with interviewees noting that it is challenging to restore democracy in a country so dependent on Russia¹⁸. Russia's threat to Belarusian sovereignty, independence, and culture further complicates the EU's efforts to craft a coherent and distinct policy toward Belarus. Apart from further cooperation with the democratic forces on this issue, further investment in cultural exchanges and Belarusian language programs by the EU would help to strengthen national identity and resilience against Russian influence. Additionally, the EU should expand support for independent media both within Belarus and in exile, providing technical assistance, capacity-building, and sustained financial support to ensure the free flow of information – especially since the cutting of funds from USAID¹⁹. More generally, the EU should think beyond the current status quo in Belarus and prepare for a range of potential scenarios, including the possibility that increased military support for Ukraine and intensified economic pressure on Russia could weaken Russia's influence on Belarus and thereby also the Belarusian regime. To this end, the EU should develop detailed contingency plans for various outcomes, such as violent crackdown, regime collapse, negotiated transition, or gradual reform (Bosse and van den Broek 2024), with specific actions and support measures outlined for each scenario. Strengthening ties with Belarusian democratic forces, civil society organisations, and diaspora communities is crucial to enable swift engagement should political shifts occur. Additionally, to substantial economic packages such as the comprehensive plan of economic support to democratic Belarus,²⁰ the EU should enhance coordination with international partners like the United States (US), the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and EU member states, ensuring a unified and effective response to developments in Belarus.

¹⁸ Interview, March 3, 2024.

¹⁹ Eastern Partnership civil society in dire straits: <https://eap-csf.eu/articles/eastern-partnership-civil-society-in-dire-straits/>

²⁰ Outline of the comprehensive plan of economic support to democratic Belarus:

https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-06/factsheet_economic_support_belarus_en.pdf

9 Conclusion

In conclusion, the resilience of the Belarusian pro-democracy movement in the face of intense repression since 2020 underscores the enduring desire for democratic change among the Belarusian people. Despite operating largely in exile, these actors have demonstrated remarkable adaptability, establishing proto-democratic structures and maintaining connections with audiences inside Belarus.

As Belarus moves on from the 2025 falsified elections, the EU continues to play a crucial role in supporting Belarusians' democratic aspirations and protecting their human rights and dignity. However, current support mechanisms face limitations, including slow response times, bureaucratic funding processes, and the lack of a clear long-term strategy. To address these issues, the EU should establish a dedicated Belarus Crisis Response Team and a high-level EU-Belarus Strategy Working Group, and create a Belarus Democracy Support Fund with simplified procedures, alongside developing a comprehensive strategic plan for engagement with Belarus.

The commitment by the new Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos to potentially double the funds available for civil society and media support in countries like Belarus represents a significant step towards addressing the financial challenges faced by pro-democracy forces. However, this increased funding should be accompanied by structural changes in how support is delivered, including mechanisms for rapid disbursement and long-term, sustainable funding commitments.

The Polish government, which holds the EU presidency until June 2025, pledged to prioritise security, including border protection with Belarus (AP News 2024). However, it is equally important that Belarusian democratic aspirations are not sidelined. The Kosciuszko Forum in Gdansk in February 2025 was a good example of this.²¹ A strong stance on democracy would reaffirm the EU's commitment to human rights and thus long-term stability, laying the groundwork for potential transitions in Belarus, even amid repression and exile. Supporting democracy abroad is not only a reflection of the EU's values-based agenda—it is essential for securing the Union's long-term stability and security.

²¹ Kosciuszko Forum in Gdansk: <https://polish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/the-kosciuszko-forum/>

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